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I. Introduction 
Amid the downturn, the Fayetteville Shale of Arkansas has provided 
some notable state and federal cases during the survey period of August 1, 
2015 to July 31, 2016.  Below are some of the highlights.   
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The Arkansas General Assembly met during the survey period; however, 
all matters concerning oil and gas dealt with funding the Arkansas Oil and 
Gas Commission and were not substantive. A few Arkansas Oil and Gas 
Commission rules took effect in July and March of 2016.1 Of note, the 
Commission updated its hearing procedures after the enactment of Senate 
Bill 778 or Act 906 of the Arkansas General Assembly.2  The purpose of 
Act 906 was to give the Commission some flexibility in scheduling 
hearings without depriving citizens of the opportunity to be heard on 
issues.3 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Drilling Not Adverse to Co-Tenant of Minerals 
In the quiet title action of SEECO, Inc. v. Holden, the Arkansas Court of 
Appeals determined whether a lessor’s possession of minerals was adverse 
to his co-tenant.4  
                                                                                                             
 1. Commission News and Alerts, Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, 
http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/. 
 2. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, GEN. RULES AND REGULATIONS A-2, A-3 (2016), 
http://www.aogc2.state.ar.us/OnlineData/Forms/Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf. Act 906 
was approved by the Arkansas General Assembly on April 1, 2015, one month before the 
survey period for this paper. 
 3. See Act 906, S.B. 778, 90th Gen Assemb., Reg. Ses. (Ark. 2015). 
 4. 473 S.W.3d 36 (Ark. App. 2015). 
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In 1912, Joyce Walls’ grandfather, W. M. Howell, acquired fee interest 
in ninety-five acres in White County; and subsequently in 1948, he sold the 
land to Raymond and Clotene Cox, reserving an undivided one-half mineral 
interest.5 Then in 1952, Raymond and Clotene Cox conveyed to Carver Ray 
and Ola Holden, Carver L. Holden’s parents, the tract of land, save and 
except the undivided one-half interest in the minerals.6   
Howell died in 1953, leaving his one-half interest in the minerals to his 
daughter, Grace Marshall. Due to nonpayment of taxes, Carver Ray Holden 
bought Grace Marshall’s interest in a tax sale in 1958, appearing to unify 
the surface with all the minerals.7 Then, Marshall died in 1983, and her 
interest eventually passed to Joyce Walls.8 In 2005, Walls executed an oil 
and gas lease that SEECO later acquired via assignment.9  There was no 
drilling conducted on the property.10 
In 2006, Carver Ray Holden conveyed to Carver L. Holden, his son and 
the appellee, the ninety-five acres complete with all the minerals.11 The 
appellee, then, executed a lease in May 2007 with drilling and production 
occurring in January 2008.12 Walls became aware of the producing wells in 
September of 2009 and filed a quiet-title action, alleging that the 1958 tax 
sale was void and that she had retained an undivided one-half interest in the 
minerals.13 A representative from the White County Tax Collector testified 
that the one-half interest was improperly recorded in the assessment book, 
as required by law at the time.14 This fact made the tax sale void, according 
to the Court of Appeals.15 
Holden argued that Walls’ claim was time-barred by the two-year statute 
of limitations.16  The circuit court agreed with Holden, stating that Walls 
did not have possession of the mineral rights within two years before filing 
her lawsuit and that Holden took possession of the minerals in May 2007 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 37. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 38. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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when he signed the lease.17 Joyce Walls and her lessee, SEECO, Inc., 
appealed.18 
The two-year adverse possession requirement comes from the statute of 
limitations found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 18–61–106(a) (Repl. 
2003), which “has been interpreted to mean that a person holding land (or a 
mineral estate) by virtue of an invalid tax deed may nevertheless dispossess 
the legal owner and gain good title if he possesses the property adversely 
and continuously for two years before the legal owner files suit.”19 
The Court of Appeals said that the adverse possession required by this 
section “must be of such character as to put the legal owner on notice that 
his rights are being challenged.”20  Because Walls and Holden are co-
owners of the mineral interests, they each had a right to go on the land and 
drill subject to the duty to account to their co-owner.21 Holden’s drilling 
was not enough to put Walls on notice that her rights to the land were being 
challenged.22 The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the 
quiet-title action and remanded the case for further proceedings.23 
B. No Reformation of Correction Deed to Include Mineral Reservation 
In Elsleger v. Runsick, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that a court 
cannot reform a correction deed to include a mineral reservation.24 
In December 2007, Jeff Van Runsick and Tonya Runsick conveyed to 
Kenneth and Gloria Elsleger their home and five acres.25 That deed 
contained the following reservation language: “RESERVING AND 
RETAINING, HOWEVER, unto the GRANTORS all oil, gas and minerals 
and all oil, gas and mineral rights and interest . . . . This conveyance 
conveys unto the GRANTEES no oil, gas or minerals and no oil, gas or 
mineral rights or interests.”26 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. at 38. 
 18. Id. at 37. 
 19. Id. at 39 (citing Hurst v. Rice, 643 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1982); Adams v. Bruder, 627 
S.W.2d 12 (Ark. 1982); Sage Land & Lumber Co. v. Hickey, 257 S.W.2d 941 (Ark. 1953); 
Honeycutt v. Sherrill, 179 S.W.2d 693 (Ark. 1944)). 
 20. Id. at 40; see Taylor v. Scott, 685 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Ark. 1985); Adams, 627 S.W.2d 
12.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 479 S.W.3d 43 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). 
 25. Id. at 45. 
 26. Id.  
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At the request of the title company, the parties executed two more 
deeds.27 Only the Runsicks signed the second deed, entitled “Warranty 
Deed.”28 This second deed included similar mineral reservation language as 
the first deed.29 In March 2008, both the Runsicks and the Elslegers 
executed a third deed, the “Correction Deed,” which its stated purpose was 
to correct the spelling of Tonya Runsick’s name.30 The correction deed did 
not include words of grant nor did it include any mineral reservation 
language.31 
Finally, in December 2008, an employee of the title company filed an 
affidavit stating that the third deed failing to mention the mineral 
reservation was the result of a scrivener’s error.32 Shortly thereafter, the 
Elslegers requested royalty payments from Chesapeake Operating, Inc. 33 
However, before making payments, Chesapeake requested that the 
Runsicks file a quitclaim deed ensuring all their interest in the minerals 
went to the Elslegers.34 The Runsicks filed suit claiming they owned the 
minerals under the land and asked for reformation of the correction deed to 
correct the mutual mistake.35 
The circuit court found that the Runsicks owned the minerals under the 
land, reforming the correction deed and reasoning that the lack of a mention 
of the reservation therein was a scrivener’s error.36 The Elslegers 
appealed.37 The Court of Appeals decision was narrow, only answering the 
question of whether reformation was proper and not answering the question 
as to who owned the minerals.38 The Court of Appeals said that the district 
court’s reformation of the correction deed was legal error, and the addition 
of a mineral reservation to such a deed goes beyond the limited scope of 
what a correction deed can do.39  
A correction deed that adds reservation or exception language not stated 
in the original deed burdens the recording system. The same can be said for 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 47. 
 31. Id. at 45. 
 32. Id. at 46. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 47. 
 37. Id. at 48. 
 38. See Id.  
 39. Id.  
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calling the forgotten mineral reservation or exception a scrivener’s error. 
Adding a reservation or adding a property interest goes beyond the scope of 
what a correction deed can do. The proper use of a correction deed is 
narrow in scope and can only be used to correct some facial imperfection in 
the title, like to correct a defective description of a single property when a 
deed recites inaccurate metes and bounds or to correct a grantor’s name. 
[citation omitted]  Our recording system is designed to allow a person to 
rely on it without using any outside research.40 
Like SEECO, the court remanded this case back to the district court for 
additional proceedings.41 
C. Damages in Breach of Warranty Claim Calculated at Time of 
Conveyance 
In 1987, Bruce Smith and Jan Smith, husband and wife, purchased from 
Mountain Pine Timber, Inc. what they thought to be all the rights in two 
tracts of land totaling 250.22 acres in Cleburne County.42 However, two 
years prior, Mountain Pine Timber, Inc. sold all the oil and gas under the 
land to CenArk Oil and Gas Company for $1.00 an acre.43 The 1987 deed 
to the Smiths did not mention a reservation or an exception to the 
minerals.44 The Smiths did not realize that their ownership of the minerals 
was in question until they unsuccessfully attempted to sell the minerals in 
2008 for $1,500.00 an acre.45 
In 2010, the Smiths filed a breach of warranty lawsuit against Mountain 
Pine Timber, Inc., a now-defunct partnership, and eventually added its 
partners to their complaint.46 A Cleburne County Circuit Court jury found 
in the Smiths’ favor, awarding them $250.22.47 The Smiths appealed.48 The 
Smiths argued that the circuit court should have calculated their damages 
based on the value of the minerals at the time of constructive eviction, 
being 2008, and that the circuit court erred in not allowing them to bring in 
such evidence.49   
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. at 50; see also Mason v. Jarrett, 234 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Ark. 1950). 
 41. Elsleger, 479 S.W.3d at 50. 
 42. Smith v. Mountain Pine Timber, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016). 
 43. Id. at 411, 414. 
 44. Id. at 411. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 412. 
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The Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the circuit court decision, 
calculating damages for a breach of warranty claim based on the value of 
the minerals rights at the time of the conveyance and declining to adopt an 
exception to this general rule.50 
D. Lessors Did Not Prove Allegedly Fraudulent Notarized Leases Caused 
Damages 
In Lipsey v. Giles, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed a grant of 
summary judgment, throwing out a case in which a class of people alleged 
the Cleburne County Circuit Court Clerk fraudulently notarized oil and gas 
leases.51  
Landmen were delivering leases signed by Cleburne County property 
owners to the clerk’s office.52 The property owners filed suit after they 
found out the clerk was notarizing the leases without witnessing the 
property owners’ signatures and then recording the instruments.53  The 
landowners were not arguing that the landmen illegally procured the leases 
but that the clerk fraudulently notarized the instruments.54 They sought an 
injunction requiring the clerk to inspect all leases received for recording for 
accuracy and to “purge any and all oil and gas leases which contain false 
notarial acknowledgments.”55 
During a circuit court hearing, the court dismissed the case sua sponte 
when it determined that the property owners could not assert any 
damages.56 The property owners appealed.57 The Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded to the circuit court to determine the damages.58 Shortly after 
remand, the clerk filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the 
property owners could not prove damages.59 In determining the damages, 
the property owners offered evidence from Tom Ferstl, an attorney and 
certified appraiser.60 In his affidavit, he swore that leases notarized by the 
clerk without witnessing the property owners’ signatures have had a 
“chilling effect” on property values “because buyers will be less likely to 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id.  
 51. 487 S.W.3d 366 (Ark. 2016). 
 52. Id. at 368. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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purchase property there knowing the uncertainty in the official county-
property records.”61 The circuit court determined that the property owners 
had not proven damages and granted the motion for summary judgment. 62 
The property owners appealed.63  
The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court, stating “conclusory 
allegations are insufficient to create a factual issue in a summary-judgment 
situation.”64  The evidence proffered did not rely on facts to support the 
claim of a “chilling effect.”65 
E. Assignee Not Liable for Predecessors Actions 
The only federal case included in this summary is Walls v. Petrohawk 
Properties, LP, from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.66 Zelda Walls, 
individually and as surviving spouse of Arlie Walls, filed suit against 
Petrohawk alleging that the company materially breached a certain oil and 
gas lease due to acts committed by previous working interest owners.67   
The Walls entered into a lease with Griffith Land Services in 2005, 
which called for a three-sixteenth royalty and contained an assignment 
provision that stated, “Lessee shall obtain written consent from Lessor 
before assigning lease to a third party which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld.”68 
Griffith Land Services assigned the lease to Alta Resources, LLC, who 
then assigned the lease to Petrohawk.69 This was all done without acquiring 
consent from the Walls.70 Additionally, Petrohawk did not pay the Walls 
the full royalty owed under the terms of the lease.71   
In May of 2010, the Walls’ attorney notified the Petrohawk by letter of 
the underpayment of royalties.72 The letter also noted that Walls signed the 
lease with Griffith Land Services, and it was their understanding that 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 369. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (citing Sundeen v. Kroger, 133 S.W.3d 393 (Ark. 2003)). 
 65. Id.  
 66. 812 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 67. Id. at 623. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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Petrohawk currently held the lease.73 After an internal audit, in October 
2010, Petrohawk cut a check for $200,000.00, which the Walls cashed.74 
Subsequently in December 2010, Petrohawk sent a letter to the Walls 
requesting their consent to assign the lease to Exxon Mobil Corporation.75 
Walls’ attorney responded by sending Petrohawk a letter stating previous 
assignments of the lease without consent constituted a breach and 
requesting more information regarding why assigning the lease to Exxon 
would be in the best interest of Walls.76 Walls filed suit the next day. 77 
Petrohawk did not respond to Walls’ letter and assigned the interest in the 
lease to Exxon later that month.78 
In the suit, Walls claimed that Petrohawk materially breached the lease 
by not obtaining consent to assign the lease and for not paying the total 
royalty amount due.79 Walls claimed Petrohawk was liable for the 
additional royalties owed by Alta, the predecessor in interest, and for a 
statutory fourteen percent per annum penalty for fraudulently withholding 
royalty payments.80  
On summary judgment motion, the district court found that Petrohawk 
did not materially breach the lease.81 In regards to the royalty payments, the 
court held that Petrohawk’s 2010 payment cured any breach, and the Walls 
subsequently waived any breach by accepting the payment.82 Additionally, 
the Walls also waived the ability to protest the assignments before Exxon 
and unreasonably withheld consent to assign to Exxon.83 Walls appealed. 84 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court rulings.85 
The appellate court first addressed the issue of royalties, stating that 
“Arkansas courts have generally not considered nonpayment of royalties a 
material breach.”86 Citing Schaffer v. Tenneco Oil Co., the appellate court 
said, “[w]here there is no cessation of marketing of oil and gas for a 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 624. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-74-602).  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 628. 
 86. Id. at 625. 
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substantial period but only the nonpayment of royalties, the lessors 
generally have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law for damages.”87 
The appellate court said that the payment of royalties was secondary to 
extracting, developing and marketing the minerals under the land, which 
Petrohawk continued to do.88 To be made whole, Petrohawk just needed to 
pay the Walls what was owed. Termination of the lease was not the right 
remedy. The appellate court held that the nonpayment of royalties in the 
case was not a material breach.89  The appellate court also mentioned that if 
it were to consider the nonpayment of royalties a breach, the Walls waived 
the breach by accepting the 2010 payment.90 
The second claim the appellate court addressed was the failure to obtain 
consent from the Walls to assign the lease.91 The Court found that the Walls 
waived all the breaches prior to the Petrohawk-Exxon assignment by the 
May 2010 attorney letter, wherein the attorney noted that Petrohawk was 
the working interest holder, and the subsequent acceptance of the 
payment.92  The appellate court found that the Walls unreasonably withheld 
consent to the Petrohawk-Exxon assignment because Walls did not allow 
Petrohawk to respond to her question regarding the reason for the 
assignment before filing suit.93  
Next, the appellate court addressed the issue of whether Petrohawk was 
liable for the shortfall of royalty payments Alta owed Walls.94 The 
appellate court said that the language of the lease does not support the 
argument that Petrohawk is liable, stating it is only “liable for obligations 
arising subsequent to the date of assignment.”95 
Lastly, the appellate court found that Walls did not provide any factual 
allegations of Petrohawk willfully or in bad faith withholding royalty 
payments; therefore, Petrohawk was not subject to the statutory penalty.96 
 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. (citing Schaffer, 647 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Ark. 1983)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at fn. 2. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 626. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 627. 
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